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The Desirability and Feasibility of Democracy in the Eyes of Private 




Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This study shows that in general, 
private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concern with the feasibility of 
democracy predisposes them toward maintaining the status quo. Drawing on a national 
survey, this research indicates that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have 
democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, 
controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. An analysis 
of a survey data on 2071 private entrepreneurs further shows that politically embedded 
entrepreneurs are not significantly less likely to endorse democratic values than non-
politically embedded entrepreneurs. In-depth interviews suggest that private 
entrepreneurs who have democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in 
China, at least in the near future. In real life, they adopt a pro-government stance in their 
economic, social and political activities. 
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Introduction 
With rapid economic growth and modernization, the prospects for democratization in 
China have become an important academic interest. A number of scholars have made 
optimistic predictions that democratization is inevitable in China and will be brought 
about by its growing economy (Diamond 1999). Some argue that “the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) will be removed from power and the existing political system 
replaced by a broadly democratic one” (Gilley 2004). Rowen (1996) even estimated that 
China would be democratic by 2015. Such optimistic predictions are inspired in part by 
the stunning expansion of China’s private sector since the early 1990s. The private sector 
accounted for 65 percent of China's GDP and contributed over 80 percent of its economic 
growth in 2006 (China Daily February 26th, 2007); and by June 2009, the private sector 
accounted for 75 percent of total employment (All China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce). As the private sector has gained increasing importance in the national 
economy, private entrepreneurs are expected to play a more important role in China’s 
political life. 
Some scholars argue that private entrepreneurs are the likely catalyst of democracy as 
their counterparts were in the West (Zheng 2004). However, other studies point out that 
they bear little democratic potential (Tsai 2007), and have been deeply embedded into the 
political system (Chen & Dickson 2010). To address the enigma of the democratic 
attitudes of Chinese private entrepreneurs, this study examines whether they are more or 
less likely to endorse democratic values than other social groups. It then tests the effects 
of political embeddedness - the political connections with the state - on private 
entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward democracy and the current government. Through in-depth 
interviews, this study further constructs a typology of Chinese private entrepreneurs 
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according to their democratic attitudes and support for the current government to get a 
better understanding of their political attitudes. 
Examining private entrepreneurs as one social group, this study finds that Chinese 
private entrepreneurs in general, are more likely to endorse the democratic values of 
political participation, rule of law and individual sovereignty than the non-entrepreneurial 
middle class and working class, with other factors being equal. The existing literature has 
paid inadequate attention to the democratic values of Chinese entrepreneurs. Instead, 
their potential interest in democratization has been well discussed in the literature, with 
the general consensus being that Chinese entrepreneurs are not possible agents for 
democratization. Although in terms of behavioral potential, this conclusion is probably an 
accurate reflection of their stance of maintaining the status quo, the democratic values of 
private entrepreneurs are still worth a more careful exploration. 
Recent studies on political attitudes of Chinese private entrepreneurs have 
emphasized their political connections, conceptualized as political embeddedness  (Chen 
& Dickson 2008, 2010), and focused on their vested material interests in maintaining the 
status quo. This study explicitly examines the effects of political embeddedness on their 
democratic values. Does political embeddedness create support for the regime and induce 
negative impressions of democracy among private entrepreneurs? Applying structural 
equation modeling (SEM) on Dickson and Chen’s 2006 survey data on private 
entrepreneurs, this study finds that political embeddedness does not have significant 
impacts on private entrepreneurs’ democratic values, but does increase their support for 
the current government. 
In-depth interviews with private entrepreneurs in Zhejiang province help to provide a 
more vivid and comprehensive picture of entrepreneurs’ political attitudes. Based on the 
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interviews, a typology of their attitudes according to their democratic views and attitudes 
toward the current government is constructed. Entrepreneurs who find democracy 
desirable tend to support the current government as well because they consider 
democracy infeasible in China, at least in the near future. The existing literature does not 
mark on the prospect of China’s becoming a democracy in the near future, or its impacts 
on private entrepreneurs’ attitudinal orientations. This paper suggests that the concern of 
the infeasibility of democracy in China predisposes Chinese private entrepreneurs toward 
maintaining the status quo.  
 The political attitudes of Chinese private entrepreneurs cannot be simply classed as 
democratic or conservative. Since the economic reforms, Chinese private entrepreneurs 
have grown up and developed considerable political knowledge. They are aware of the 
differences between a democracy and a one-party system, and have formed their own 
understandings of Chinese politics and its political development. With higher social 
status, higher political efficacy, and higher stakes in government policies, both in theory 
and in practice, private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than non-
entrepreneurial classes. Neither political embeddedness nor political background 
influences their democratic values significantly. However, despite their democratic 
values, they would generally argue that democracy is not suitable for China, at least not 
in the near future. As one entrepreneur employing around 100 workers producing hangers 
told me "in the long run, one party ruling couldn't be right. Democracy is the direction. 
However, for today's China, one party ruling is more suitable." In previous public opinion 
surveys and in real life, entrepreneurs appear to be conservative regime supporters. 
This study is organized as follows. The first part briefly reviews the literature on the 
relationship between economic development with a growth of capitalists and 
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democratization. The second part, drawing on a national survey, the Chinese General 
Social Survey (CGSS) 2006, explores the democratic values of Chinese private 
entrepreneurs as a whole by comparing them with other social groups. The following part 
analyzes a survey data on 2071 private entrepreneurs (Dickson and Chen’s data) to 
examine the effects of political embeddedness on their democratic values and support for 
the current government. In the fourth section, based on interviews with private 
entrepreneurs in Zhejiang province conducted in December 2010, this study proposes a 
typology of Chinese entrepreneurs to show that their concern of the feasibility of 
democracy drives them to be status quo oriented. The final part explores the implications 
of the findings and concludes the paper. 
 
Literature on Chinese private entrepreneurs and democratization 
There has been a long endeavor to explore the relationship between economic 
development and democracy. The modernization theory, which originates from the 
hypothesis first proposed by Lipset (1959), has an abundant and complex literature 
discussing how economic development accompanied by an expanding service sector, 
higher educational levels and modernized values would favor democratization. However, 
the work of Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1997, 158-159, 165), opposed to 
this classic proposition, demonstrated that “the probability that any given country would 
become democratic does not change as its level of income rises.”  
Democratization happens at any level of development. The reason why democracy 
and a developed economy always come together is that democracy under prosperous 
conditions tends to be stable. This argument is influential among social scientists, and is a 
serious challenge to the modernization theory. Later on, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes 
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(2003, 518-519) put forward another argument that “development increases both the 
probability of the transition to democracy and the probability that an existing democracy 
will sustain itself.” The main reason for this endogenous democratic transition is that 
“capitalists living in a rich dictatorship are likely to choose democracy.” (Boix & Stokes 
2003, 540) 
The role of capitalists is highlighted in the transition literature, as in the old 
proposition by Moore (1966, 418) "no bourgeois, no democracy" and the classical 
argument by Schumpeter (1976, 296-297) that “modern democracy is a product of the 
capitalist process”. Capitalists are believed to be the potential catalyst of democratization 
in authoritarian countries for a number of reasons: the capitalist mode of production 
requiring a free market, the capitalists' preference of higher degree of representation in 
decision making process and their strong desire for the protection of private property. 
Scholars have applied this logic to Chinese political development. White predicted in 
1994 that privatization and expansion of the private economy would gradually complete 
China’s transition into a liberal democracy. The balance of power between state and 
society would continue to shift in a direction favorable to pluralist politics, which could 
in turn strengthen the impetus for further change in the political system. Zheng (2004, 
311) argues that “Chinese business owners are likely to play a role that their European 
counterparts did in the past, and Capitalism is generating a Chinese bourgeoisie. It is a 
class with teeth.” 
 However, according to Eva Bellin (2000), capitalists are contingent democrats in 
late-developing countries. Their enthusiasm for democracy is contingent on their 
dependence on the state and their fear of disorder. “So long as the state generally 
anticipates the interests of private sector capital, capital does not feel compelled to create 
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formal democratic institutions to ensure state accountability.” (Bellin 2000, 181) Recent 
empirical studies on political attitudes of Chinese private entrepreneurs have reached a 
corresponding conclusion that they are unlikely to be agents of democratization (Yang 
2006, Tsai 2007, Chen & Dickson 2010). These studies have pointed out that generally, 
private entrepreneurs support the government led by the CCP due to their dependence on 
the state for their prosperity, and also their common interests with the CCP in continuous 
economic development and sociopolitical stability. 
Pearson (1997) described a hybrid pattern of state-society relations, which contained 
both “socialist corporatism” and “clientelism”, by examining the relations between the 
state and two segments of China’s new business elite: the foreign sector managers and 
private entrepreneurs. She pointed out that although they had obtained a striking degree 
of structural autonomy from the state compared to other economic groups, and their 
views toward economic reform and politics were firmly pro-market and to a large extent, 
anti-regime and anti-communist, they won’t develop contentious relations with the state. 
Instead, they rely on personal and clientelistic relations with officials to get business done. 
On the other hand, by revitalizing business associations, the state has attempted to co-opt 
potentially influential entrepreneurs. She believed that this hybrid pattern was likely to 
endure, and that the business elite won’t convert its privileged economic position, 
structural independence, and ideological predilections into a force for democratization. In 
her study, political relationship with the state as social corporatism and clientelism were 
emphasized in explaining private entrepreneurs’ low demand for democratization, but the 
exact effects of political relationship on entrepreneurs’ attitudes were not tested. 
Dickson (2003) described the corporatist strategy adopted by the CCP to both 
cooperate with private entrepreneurs and to monitor and control their activities. Studying 
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private entrepreneurs with large firms, he demonstrated that these capitalists shared 
similar views on key political issues with government officials, and were very reluctant to 
promote democratization (Dickson 2007). In his 2008 paper with Chen, they measured 
political embeddedness as having CCP membership, membership of the All China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), or being a deputy in people’s congresses 
(PC) or people’s political consultative conferences (PPCC). They found that the 
politically embedded capitalists were not significantly more likely to support the 
government, stating “only red capitalists who were former cadres were reliable supporters 
of the government, other ties to the state did not create support for the regime” (Chen & 
Dickson 2008). This result is different from the common argument in this group of 
literature that the capitalists with closer ties to the state should be more supportive of 
government, either because the CCP’s recruitment strategy is to select the most 
trustworthy capitalists or because political embeddedness bringing along economic 
benefits creates support for the regime. In this study, the relationship between 
embeddedness and government support is retested in the third section, as well as the 
effects of political background including the experiences as former cadres on government 
support. 
According to Tsai (2005), Chinese private entrepreneurs were very diversified and 
could hardly be identified as one “unified” class. She pointed out that taking into account 
their employment background and firm’s characteristics is essential in understanding 
their interests and intentions. She actually found that former state owned enterprises 
(SOE) managers were more likely to be demanding of the state and less inclined to 
support the status quo (2007). This finding is cross-examined in this paper. The impacts 
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of several other personal and firm’s characteristics on entrepreneurs’ democratic values 
and support for the government are also tested. 
The competing hypotheses about Chinese capitalists in the literature leave the 
question of their democratic potential unresolved. Is the modernization theory valid and 
applicable in China? Do Chinese capitalists endorse democratic values and principles? In 
the literature describing Chinese private entrepreneurs’ reluctance to demand 
democratization, formal and informal political ties to the state are emphasized, but these 
studies leave the exact impacts of political embeddedness on democratic values 
inadequately explored. This study joins the discussion by addressing these questions. 
 
Democratic values of private entrepreneurs 
In this part, private entrepreneurs are examined as to whether they are more or less 
likely to have democratic values than other social groups. The outcome variable is the 
endorsement of democratic values. It is different from the understanding of feasibility of 
democracy in China, or initiatives for democratization. In other words, the endorsement 
of democratic values is measuring whether a private entrepreneur finds democracy 
desirable, but not whether he thinks China should be a democracy, or whether he is likely 
to advocate or support a regime change. The latter two issues involve their judgments of 
the feasibility of democracy in China and their behavioral intentions. Their perceptions of 
the feasibility of democracy are discussed in the latter part of this study, while behavioral 
intentions are more difficult to predict. Current literature generally believes that Chinese 
private entrepreneurs are not going to push for democratic transitions; traditional wisdom 
also tells us that a wealthy middle class is always a force stabilizing society. But during 
political transitions, their support for the status quo could be withdrawn, so the 
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discussions of their perceptions of democracy, which would impact their shift, are more 
meaningful.  
Compared to other strata in China, private entrepreneurs are believed to be more 
likely to find democracy desirable. First, capitalists have higher stakes in the 
government's policies; therefore they have a stronger desire to be represented in the 
decision-making process. For instance, they desire more input in economic regulation 
policies. In many circumstances, private entrepreneurs understand the necessities of 
regulation, but the undemocratic decision-making arouses complaints. An explicit 
example from the fieldwork is that recently the government has strictly limited the 
consumption of electricity by small-scale enterprises in order to raise energy 
consumption efficiency. Local government decides the upper limits of electricity 
consumption for enterprises with different scales. When the limit is reached, the relevant 
bureaucrats just cut the electric supply to the specific enterprise without a suitable 
cushion period for the enterprise to adjust its production plan. The small-scale enterprises 
wish their opinions could be taken into account before the government takes such actions. 
The non-democratic procedures of decision-making and policy implementation are often 
responsible for their losses. Facing many specific problems like this in their daily 
operations, the capitalists prefer a more democratic system with more participation, so 
that their interests could be better represented in the decisions of many policies, which 
directly affect their economic interests. 
Second, the capitalist mode of production desires a free market and fair competition. 
The business environment in China does not really satisfy these requirements. SOEs still 
have a monopoly in some profitable industries. There’s almost no tax revenues from 
private-sector financial firms or other state-dominated industries, which shows that 
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private enterprises could only develop in parts of the economy (China Daily December 
18th, 2007). In terms of bank loans, although the situation is improving, it is still harder 
for private enterprises, especially those with small scales, to get loans from state-run 
banks. SOEs also enjoy the advantages of public financial support and all other kinds of 
policy benefits. When competing with foreign companies operating in China, local 
private enterprises are also at a disadvantage. Foreign enterprises enjoy various beneficial 
local policies because local governments are competing with each other to attract foreign 
investment. In a more democratic system, the business monopolies based on state power 
will decrease along with the distortion of the market by the state.  
Third, private entrepreneurs have a stronger desire to protect their private property. 
Private enterprises have only developed quickly since the 1990s. In 1977, they were still 
illegal and negligible. From 1978 to 1983, the private sector was limited to individual 
businesses, which were strongly experimental and were intended to play a “marginal, 
stop-gap role”. After the 1990s, although the private economy has experienced a rapid 
expansion and the Property Law came into effect in 2007; without legal constraints and 
effective public monitoring of government behaviors, the credibility of the government's 
commitment in protecting the private economy is still problematic. The arbitrariness in 
decision-making and policy implementation leaves the private property under-protected. 
In recent years, predatory behaviors among local government officials have become 
widespread due to decentralization (Pei 2006). Local government officials enjoy the 
power of revenue raising and everyday economic decision-making, but face no effective 
monitoring from the public. Furthermore, due to the serious principal-agent problem, the 
monitoring capacity of the central government is also declining. Private entrepreneurs are 
the main targets of compulsory donations, irregular use of regulatory power and other 
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kinds of predatory behaviors of local officials. As a result, entrepreneurs should require 
rule of law and the power of supervision over government officials. 
Finally, private entrepreneurs have higher political self-efficacy. Through their daily 
interactions with local officials, private entrepreneurs have a higher probability of getting 
first hand experience about how politics works at the local level than the working class. 
They are more likely to be exposed to the problems of the current system. Besides their 
direct political experience, the granting of more autonomy and economic resources 
should also provide them with higher political self-efficacy, which implies they have a 
greater confidence in their abilities of political participation.  
Compared to capitalists, other groups such as the middle and working classes are 
probably in significantly different positions. The groups defined as middle class, include 
professionals, low-level civil servants and managers in SOEs or foreign companies. They 
are diverse in terms of their occupations, backgrounds as well as political attitudes. Civil 
servants and managers in SOEs are more likely to be conservative, and foreign 
companies’ employees are more likely to be political apathetic. For the middle class as a 
whole, their material interests are not affected by the government policies as directly as 
private entrepreneurs', and their incentives for establishing a fully institutionalized free 
market are not as strong as private entrepreneurs’.  
According to recent studies (Perry 2007, Li 2010), the political attitudes of the 
working class in China - namely the peasants and workers - are not very clear. Although 
"rights defense activities" initiated by ordinary workers and peasants have become 
widespread in China in recent years, scholars disagree with each other on whether these 
activities  (such as petition and demonstration) are demonstrating rights consciousness or 
just rule consciousness of Chinese people. Perry (2007, 2008 and 2009) believes that 
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popular contention is driven by rule consciousness rather than rights consciousness, and 
imposes no major challenge to the current Party-state. However, through deep analyses of 
the public and private announcements and activities of some workers participating in 
demonstration and some peasants engaging in petition, Li (2010) finds that there are clues 
implying that it is problematic to conclude that Chinese ordinary people only have rule 
consciousness but no rights consciousness. However, despite the disagreement, over 
whether the working class has rights consciousness or not, there is still a distance 
between their consciousness of rights and the consciousness of democratic rules to 
protect their rights. Also, the rights that ordinary people have most likely realized are 
their economic rights but not their fundamental political rights of political participation 
and public monitoring of political power.  
 
Empirical testing of the democratic values of private entrepreneurs 
The data used in the quantitative analyses is the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey, 
which has a multistage stratified national probability sample of 10151 adults aged 22 to 
74 from all regions of China (except Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia provinces). Samples 
from rural and urban areas were drawn separately, yielding 4,138 rural cases and 6,013 
urban cases. This survey is conducted jointly by the Survey Research Center in Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology and the sociology department of the 
People's University of China and is led by Professor Bian Yanjie and Professor Li Lulu. 
It covers questions about values and attitudes, which are used in this analysis. 
Six items from the questionnaire are selected to measure democratic values. These 
items are consistent with the general definition of democratic values in empirical studies. 
Gibson (1996) and his associates define democratic citizens as ones “who believe in 
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individual liberty and who are politically tolerant, … who are obedient but nonetheless 
willing to assert rights against the state, who view the state as constrained by legality, and 
who support basic democratic institutions and processes’’. Nathan and Shi (1993) were 
the first to attempt a study of the democratic orientations of Chinese people. They 
measured the support for democratic values from three dimensions: government saliency, 
political efficacy and political tolerance. The items selected in this study measure 
respondents’ desire for political participation, rule of law, and a sense of individual 
sovereignty.  
Table 1 demonstrates the distributions of the endorsement of democratic values 
among private entrepreneurs, the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class. 
Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statements in the 
questionnaire. Four answers are available: strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly 
disagree. Each question is recoded into a binary variable, with the value 1 indicating pro-
democratic values. The percentages in the Table 1 are the percentages of people among 
these three groups who are pro democratic in terms of each question. 
In the quantitative analyses, the items measuring desires for political participation and 
rule of law are combined separately to form two additive indexes, ranging from 2 
(indicating not pro-democracy) to 8 (indicating pro-democracy). The other two items are 
analyzed as binary variables, applying a Logit regression model. Logit analysis is also 
applied to Item 2 (chances for direct elections of Mayors), which explicitly expresses the 
support for democratic process. 
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Table 1 Democratic values among private entrepreneurs, non-entrepreneurial middle class and 









Political participation    
1. I know what is happening in my community; it is my 
right to participate in the public affairs (Agree). 
79.33 76.12 73.65 
2. There should be chances to have direct elections of 
mayors. (Agree)  
48.00 42.31 39.56 
Rule of law    
3. When government decisions are not consistent with 
the law, government decisions should have priority 
over law. (Disagree) 
38.53 39.95 33.48 
4. Law only functions properly with the government’s 
strong support and cooperation. (Disagree) 
16.37 16.78 13.31 
Other     
5. It is always right to obey the government. (Disagree) 40.64 40.8 32.83 
6. It is not necessary to enhance democracy if the 
economy could maintain stable development 
(Disagree) 
65.27 63.09 51.40 
Observations (6,700) 167 905 5,628 
 
It requires employing more than eight people to be a private enterprise; otherwise it is 
called an “individual business”. Accordingly, people who own private enterprises and 
employ more than eight people are defined as private entrepreneurs in this analysis. The 
other two groups are defined according to their occupations. The non-entrepreneurial 
middle class contains the managers in state-owned and foreign enterprises, employees in 
government and public agencies, professionals and intellectuals who do not own 
enterprises. Working class refers to office clerks, skilled and unskilled workers, self-
employed and farmers. Table 2 describes the distribution of the three groups in CGSS 
2006. The percentage of private entrepreneurs is relatively small, but in a national 
probability sample, this low percentage is reasonable. 
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Table 2: Distribution of private entrepreneurs, non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, 
CGSS 2006 
 Percentage% No. 
Private entrepreneur (base group) 2.49 167 
Non-entrepreneurial middle class 13.51 905 
Working class 84.00 5,628 
Total 100 6,700 
 
Previous studies (Chen & Dickson 2008, 2010) emphasize the importance of the 
political embeddedness of private entrepreneurs in influencing their political attitudes. 
Political connections with the state are assumed to be important predictors of individuals’ 
democratic values. In this test, political connection is simply measured by whether they 
are CCP members or not. For ordinary people, CCP party membership is a major way for 
them to gain political education, and they will probably form political attitudes 
accordingly. Party branches are required to regularly organize ideological education 
among members, and the central leaders will occasionally propose intensive national 
campaigns for party members to study the “spirit” of the Center. These activities and 
campaigns aim at keeping the minds of party members consistent with the Party. 
Therefore CCP members are assumed to be less likely to have democratic values. 
Those working in the public sector are also educated by the state in formal or 
informal ways. People working in government agencies, SOEs and public institutions are 
also objects of regular political propaganda. They are under tighter control by the state 
ideologically than people working in the private sector or those who are self-employed. 
The occupational sector is controlled in this test. People working in the public sector are 
supposed to be less likely to find democracy desirable than others.  
Formal political participation and family background are other factors believed to 
influence individuals’ democratic values. The variables included in this analysis are 
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whether or not the respondent participated in the recent local election and the 
respondent’s father’s party membership. The voting behavior in China is perceived as an 
expression of support for the current system, so people who voted in local elections are 
supposed to be less supportive of democratic values. Respondents with a father as a CCP 
member are more likely to be influenced by orthodox communist ideology and 
subsequently less likely to have democratic values. 
Some studies point out that various local conditions in terms of economic 
development and political context are also influential on people’s attitudes to democracy. 
In this study, two variables are included to control regional effects: a variable indicating 
the eastern, central or western part of China and the proportion of employees employed in 
private sector at the provincial level. The division among eastern, central and western 
China generally controls the level of social development, and the provincial percentage of 
employees in the private sector accounts for the contribution of the private sector to the 
local economy. Some other variables measuring personal socio-demographic features are 
included in the test: educational attainment, gender, age, rural or urban hukou status and 
logged annual household income. The summary statistics of the control variables in the 
dataset CGSS 2006 can be found in table 9 in the Appendix.  
The results of the data analysis are presented in table 3. According to the results, the 
Chinese private entrepreneurs are generally more likely to endorse democratic values 
than the other two groups, with relevant political, regional and demographic effects 
controlled. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the two additive indexes of 
desires for political participation and rule of law are consistent with the results of 
maximum likelihood estimation. The results are consistent across models. In the 
dimension of political participation, the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working 
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class are both less likely than private entrepreneurs to express desire for political 
participation. The stronger support for political participation of private entrepreneurs is 
probably a demonstration of their higher stakes in government decisions than the other 
two groups. While in terms of desire for rule of law, there is no significant difference 
between private entrepreneurs and the non-entrepreneurial middle class in this sample; 
the working classes are significantly less likely to have the value of rule of law. It is 
plausible that the occupational differences between private entrepreneurs and the non-
entrepreneurial middle class do not influence their values of rule of law significantly. 
According to the other three models, where single indicators measure democratic 
values, the other two groups are also less likely to demonstrate democratic values than 
private entrepreneurs. The results from model 3 show that the probability for the non-
entrepreneurial middle class to support direct election is smaller than the probability of 
private entrepreneurs by 31.3 percentage points, and for the working class, the probability 
of supporting direct election is 40.5 percentage points smaller, holding other variables 
equal. As measured by individual sovereignty, the attitudes among private entrepreneurs 
and the non-entrepreneurial middle class are not significantly different in this sample. 
The single indicator measurement may be responsible for the result. However, private 
entrepreneurs are still more likely to support individual sovereignty than the working 
class. Estimates of model 4 suggests that the probability of working class people to 
realize individual sovereignty is smaller than for private entrepreneurs by 32.9 percentage 
points, with other factors controlled. The results of model 5 are consistent with other 
models, and demonstrate that private entrepreneurs are more likely to support democratic 
development even with a stable growth of economy than the non-entrepreneurial middle 
class by 31.6 percentage points, and the working class by 38.2 percentage points.  
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Table 3 Results of comparing democratic values of Private Entrepreneurs with non-
entrepreneurial middle class and working class, CGSS 2006 
Variables 
OLS  Logit (MLE) 
(Model 1) (Model 2)  (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Political 







Social strata (base group: private entrepreneurs) 
Non-entre middle class -.090** -.037 -.375** -.179 -.380** 
 (.043) (.035) (.182) (.206) (.189) 
Working class -.125*** -.072** -.519*** -.399** -.481*** 
 (.039) (.032) (.166) (.186) (.173) 
CCP membership (yes=1) .061*** .002 .255*** .013 .198** 
 (.022) (.018) (.092) (.115) (.094) 
Occupational sector (base group: private sector)  
Public owned business  .010 -.031 .044 -.195 .180 
 (.027) (.022) (.114) (.138) (.115) 
Government agency  .100** -.042 .422** -.268 .456** 
 (.044) (.036) (.193) (.237) (.198) 
Public institution -.071 .019 -.299 .119 .037 
 (.052) (.042) (.225) (.260) (.222) 
Self-employed / farmer -.044* -.006 -.186* -.033 -.034 
 (.026) (.021) (.112) (.135) (.112) 
Vote in the recent election .015 -.024** .065 -.162** .079 
 (.013) (.011) (.057) (.071) (.056) 
Father’s CCP membership .086*** .001 .360*** .008 .259*** 
 (.021) (.017) (.089) (.110) (.092) 
Region (base group: eastern) 
Central -.027 .011 -.120 .070 -.288*** 
 (.017) (.014) (.074) (.092) (.073) 
Western -.059*** -.038** -.259*** -.243** -.617*** 
 (.019) (.015) (.082) (.099) (.081) 
Employees in private sector  .001 .001 .002 .003 .001 
(provincial %) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.004) (.003) 
Educational attainment (base group: lower than elementary) 
Elementary .002 -.021 .024 -.132 -.096 
 (.025) (.020) (.112) (.128) (.104) 
Junior Secondary .027 -.036* .136 -.237* .040 
 (.025) (.020) (.112) (.130) (.105) 
Senior Secondary .024 -.022 .123 -.139 -.024 
 (.028) (.023) (.125) (.146) (.119) 
Post Secondary .117*** -.008 .506*** -.057 .112 
 (.035) (.028) (.153) (.181) (.150) 
Female -.065*** -.021** -.282*** -.139** -.157*** 
 (.012) (.010) (.053) (.065) (.052) 
Age  -.001* -.001 -.004* -.003 -.011*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
Rural -.063*** -.007 -.272*** -.043 -.342*** 
 (.017) (.014) (.072) (.088) (.071) 
Annual household income  .000 .003 .002 .021 -.030 
(Logged) (.008) (.006) (.033) (.040) (.033) 
Constant .627*** .291*** .526 -.874 1.748*** 
 (.103) (.083) (.447) (.534) (.441) 
Observations 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 
R-squared .053 .006    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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In summary, private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than 
the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class in China, with other factors being 
controlled. The next question to consider is why private entrepreneurs are the relatively 
more democratic social group in Chinese society. According to existing literature, due to 
their formal and informal political connections with the government, they are believed as 
being conservative and sharing views on key political issues with government officials. 
Indeed, establishing and maintaining various connections with government officials to 
resolve problems is a common practice among Chinese private entrepreneurs. Why then 
are the more commonly politically embedded private entrepreneurs more likely to 
demonstrate democratic values than other social groups? What are the effects of political 
embeddedness on democratic values and attitudes toward the current government among 
private entrepreneurs? The following part examines these questions.  
 
Political embeddedness, democratic values and government support 
Drawing on the survey data collected from Chinese private entrepreneurs by Jie 
Chen and Bruce Dickson, this part examines how embeddedness affects private 
entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward democracy and the current government. Are politically 
embedded entrepreneurs more likely to support the government, and less likely to have 
democratic values? By differentiating between political connections gained before and 
after commencing business, the model is supposed to be able to test the possible spurious 
relationship between political embeddedness and attitudes, in which case, embeddedness 
and attitudes can both be explained by private entrepreneurs’ political background before 
entering businesses. It also explores whether the allocation of financial resources as state-
run bank loans is a possible mediating channel for embeddedness to have its effects. 
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Data and Methods 
Data used in this part from a survey of Chinese private entrepreneurs has been kindly 
given by Jie Chen and Bruce Dickson. They conducted this survey in five coastal 
provinces in China where the private sector is most developed: Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. The survey was taken between late 2006 and early 
2007. The following is the introduction to the sampling procedure of the survey in their 
book (2010, 165-166): 
The sample was designed to capture firms of different sizes and types of operations, and in areas 
of different levels of development. Respondents were selected with a multistage random 
sampling technique. In the first stage, all county-level units within each province were stratified 
into three levels – high, medium, and low – according to their levels of economic development 
measured by per capita GDP. Counties were randomly selected from each level of economic 
development in each province, using the probability proportional to size (PPS) technique…a total 
of forty counties were selected: fourteen, twelve, and fourteen counties, respectively, from high, 
medium, and low levels of economic development. In the second stage, the registered private 
enterprises within each selected county were grouped into industrial / commercial sectors (e.g., 
manufacturing, transportation, retail, and food service), and then enterprises were randomly 
chosen from each sector with probability of selection proportional to the size of the sector. There 
were 2,300 enterprises selected and either the owner or one of the major investors of each 
selected enterprise was interviewed. A total of 2,071 questionnaires were completed, with a 
response rate of 90 percent…this sample was representative of various economic development 
levels, diverse industrial / economic sectors, and different sized firms. 
Structure equation modeling (SEM) is applied in data analyses. First, confirmatory factor 
analysis is used to construct the latent variables of political embeddedness, democratic 
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values and governmental support. Then a path model is applied to examine their 
relationships. 
Outcome Variables: democratic values and attitudes toward the government 
The endorsement of democratic values is measured in consistency with the definition 
and measurement specified in the former part. The latent endorsement of democratic 
values is constructed using five indicators, which Chen and Dickson (2010, 77) used to 
form an additive index as the measurement of democratic support in their book. 
Respondents were asked about their opinions toward the following items indicating 
individuals’ support for multiparty competition and individual liberty and sovereignty, 
with five choices available ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Table 4 
presents the distribution of these items. 











disagree % N 
Government leaders are like heads of family, 
and their decisions should be obeyed 6.18 29.41 24.54 32.81 7.06 2,054 
If a country has multiple parties, it can lead 
to political chaos 10.33 30.02 31.28 25.46 2.91 2,062 
A one-party system promotes economic, 
social, and political development, and is 
most suitable to China 15.17 44.89 26.71 11.29 1.94 2,063 
Public demonstrations can easily turn into 
social disturbances and impact social 
stability and should be forbidden 20.39 39.85 22.47 15.59 1.69 2,065 
Forming various kinds of nongovernmental 
organizations can easily damage social 
stability 12.39 27.16 28.57 28.04 3.84 2,058 
 
Disagreement with these items indicates having democratic values. Chinese private 
entrepreneurs are fairly democratically minded. Around 30% of them explicitly express 
their disagreement with these items, and if we consider the expression of “neither agree 
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nor disagree” as implicit disagreement due to the limited freedom of speech in China, the 
majority of entrepreneurs disagree with these items to a certain extent. The result of the 
confirmatory factor analysis shows that the five questions constitute a single latent 
construct. Standardized factor loadings can be found in table 10 in the Appendix. 
The effect of political embeddedness on private entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward the 
Chinese government is another dimension this part examines. Since there are few items 
measuring their attitudes toward the fundamental political system in China, this study 
measures entrepreneurs’ support for the government using their satisfactions of the 
government’s performance in various policy dimensions, the specific support 
conceptualized by Easton (1965, 1975). Specific support, distinct from diffuse support, 
measures a person’s satisfaction with the policies and performance of the government. 
The object of specific support is not the fundamental values and norms, but the specific 
authorities, including the political leadership, policy outcomes and the overall 
performance of the government. 
Given the circumstances in China, specific support is a more valid measurement 
because diffuse support could be easily inflated in survey results. Under an authoritarian 
regime, people do not feel comfortable to honestly express their opinions toward the 
fundamental political system and principles ruling the country. In addition, many scholars 
believe that there is a wide deficiency in identity with the regime per se. Most Chinese 
understand that what is happening in China is not socialism, and after the extreme trust in 
socialism and resulted Cultural Revolution during Mao’s period, socialism is no longer 
attractive to Chinese people. The economic reform has turned the whole of society 
towards pragmatism rather than caring about fundamental norms. The legitimacy of the 
Chinese government is largely based on the economic development, provision of social 
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welfare, and other key services of the government (He 2003). Therefore for a 
performance-based government like China, specific support is essential to the regime. Six 
items are used to construct the latent support for the government among private 
entrepreneurs (see Table 5).  













Providing job security 2.81 11.92 48.06 33.91 3.29 2,064 
Narrowing the gap between rich 
and poor 7.27 24.98 43.55 21.92 2.28 2,062 
Improving housing conditions 2.53 13.19 44.04 34.74 5.50 2,055 
Maintaining social order 3.57 12.51 32.05 44.21 7.67 2,047 
Providing adequate medical care 6.34 20.20 41.61 28.39 3.46 2,050 
Providing welfare to the needy 2.98 13.46 46.78 32.78 4.00 2,050 
 
Support for the government among Chinese private entrepreneurs is not as high as 
predicted by studies emphasizing their conservativeness, at least measured by satisfaction 
of government’s performance. Only around one third of entrepreneurs consider that the 
government has done a good job in each policy area, except for a higher level of 
satisfaction in the dimension of maintaining social order. Others are dissatisfied with the 
government’s performance in these policy dimensions to a certain extent. Although 
dissatisfaction does not necessarily mean willingness to change, it does reduce the 
regime’s appeal to private entrepreneurs. Confirmatory factor analysis supports the idea 
that the six questions are indicating a single latent factor (see table 10 in the Appendix).  
Explanatory Variable: political embeddedness 
The explanatory variable is political embeddedness, which is the key factor 
emphasized in recent studies trying to understand the conservativeness of private 
entrepreneurs. They argue that the CCP uses a corporatist strategy to cooperate with 
wealthy private entrepreneurs, and the latter enjoy the benefits of close ties with the state. 
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By pointing out the connections between entrepreneurs and the state, either personal or 
institutional, these studies conclude that entrepreneurs share political values with 
government officials, and are not likely to demand democratic reforms (Dickson 2003, 
Tsai 2005, Pearson 1997).  
In previous studies, political embeddedness is measured by CCP party membership, 
access to government positions and membership in officially sponsored business 
associations (Chen & Dickson 2010). The CCP is still considered a key political 
institution that entrepreneurs can be co-opted into. The party remains the entry point for 
access to political connections. This paper also uses CCP membership as a key indicator 
of political embeddedness. In this data, entrepreneurs were classified as CCP members 
(36.96%), members in the eight Chinese democratic parties (2.46%), and entrepreneurs 
with no party membership (60.56%). 
Another important indicator of embeddedness is entrepreneurs’ access to government 
posts, especially in people’s congresses and political consultative conferences. Given the 
fact that almost all candidates and all elected deputies in these government bodies have 
been scrutinized and approved by the party, the entrepreneurs with government jobs are 
the ones trusted by the state and enjoying close political connections. In this study, 
position in people’s congresses is used as an indicator. Respondents were asked whether 
they had been appointed as delegates in various levels of people’s congresses.  
Table 6 Have you been appointed as delegates in people’s congresses? 
Never Township level County level Prefectural level  Provincial level National level  N 
80.60% 6.76% 9.03% 3.23% .29% .10% 2,071 
 
A third indicator of embeddedness is whether there is a party organization in the 
private enterprise. Private enterprises are not required to build party organizations. The 
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party does not firmly control ideology in private sector. Pearson (1997) referred to this 
autonomy as structural independence. The entrepreneurs closely embedded into the 
system will build or be required to build party organizations in their enterprises. In the 
data considered here, 30.66% of 2,071 enterprises have party organizations. Confirmatory 
factor analysis shows that the three indicators are reliable and constitute a single factor, 
political embeddedness (see table 10 in the Appendix). 
Mediator Variable: access to state-run bank loans 
The economic benefits of political embeddedness are assumed to influence the 
political attitudes of private entrepreneurs. It has been agreed that political embeddedness 
not only conveys political privileges, but also signifies economic opportunities, such as 
fewer arbitrary regulations, less predatory behavior by local officials, access to state-run 
bank loans and policy information. All these bring enterprises economic benefits. As 
presented in Chen and Dickson’s study, the data shows that politically embedded 
capitalists do operate enterprises with better performance. Do the economic benefits 
along with political embeddedness have impacts on entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward 
democracy and the current government? Limited by the data, the indicator of whether the 
enterprise has gained state-run bank loans is the only variable that can capture the 
benefits of political embeddedness. Thus besides the indirect effects through this single 
hypothetical mediator variable, political embeddedness should still have direct effects on 
government support and democratic values. In the present sample, 31.76% of 2,071 
entrepreneurs have gained loans from state-run banks.  
Three hypotheses can be formulated based on the former discussion. First, political 
embeddedness should facilitate access to state-run bank loans. Second, entrepreneurs who 
have gained concrete economic benefits should have positive attitudes toward the 
M.Phil.	  in	  Government	  and	  Public	  Administration                                              Thesis:	  JIN	  Shuai 
 27 
government, but negative attitudes toward democracy. Third, besides the indirect effects 
through access to bank loans, political embeddedness should also have direct effects on 
government support and democratic desirability. The former effect is assumed to be 
positive, while the latter negative. 
Control variables: political background, firm and individual characteristics 
This test includes three groups of control variables, political background, firm’s 
characteristics and demographic features. As emphasized by Kellee Tsai (2005), personal 
background is important in influencing private entrepreneurs’ values and should be taken 
into account. Political background is measured in five ways. Respondents were asked, 
before businesses, whether they were government officials and the levels of their 
positions, whether they were SOE employees and the types of jobs done, whether they 
served as village cadres and whether they were veterans. The other measurement is 
whether the entrepreneur entered the CCP before having an enterprise. Former officials, 
SOE employees, village cadres, veterans and CCP members before businesses are 
supposed to be conservative because of their previous experiences. No matter whether 
they are currently politically embedded or not, they are supposed to be more likely to 
support the government than others. So these five background variables are assumed to 
have direct negative effects on democratic desirability and direct positive effects on 
government support.  
Former government officials, SOE employees, village cadres and veterans had 
various levels of political connections to the state before they started enterprises. These 
connections were not necessarily cut after they entered businesses. Instead, these 
connections would facilitate the entrepreneurs to build new ties. Also those who joined 
the CCP before becoming entrepreneurs were more likely to be selected into the political 
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system. Therefore these five background variables are measuring the inherited political 
capital of entrepreneurs to a certain extent, and that should affect their current level of 
political embeddedness. So these five variables are assumed to have positive effects on 
political embeddedness. With this specification, this model is able to test whether 
political embeddedness still has independent impacts on democratic desirability and 
government support, with the effects of political background controlled. 
Former political background also creates closer personal connections that cannot be 
captured by formal and institutional embeddedness. These personal connections can also 
facilitate entrepreneurs’ access to economic benefits, and thus affect their attitudes. David 
Wank (2002) found that entrepreneurs who were formerly officials had an advantage of 
knowing government officials and operation procedures and hence tended to have a 
smoother experience getting things done. Therefore access to state-run bank loans could 
also be an indicator for the effects of informal personal ties resulting from political 
background on entrepreneurs’ attitudes. The five political background variables are 
assumed to have positive effects on access to state-run bank loans. 
Firm’s characteristics are measured in five ways. Number of employees measures the 
size of an enterprise. Annual net profit after tax in ten thousand yuan in 2005 measures 
the profitability of an enterprise. The percentage of annual earnings gained from 
businesses within the local province indicates the importance of local businesses to an 
enterprise, and the percentage of earnings from exports measures the extent of foreign 
connections to an enterprise. The fifth variable of firm characteristics is whether it is a 
former SOE or collective enterprise. These five variables are all assumed to affect 
entrepreneurs’ political embeddedness, access to bank loans, and attitudes toward 
democracy and the government. 
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The private entrepreneurs with bigger and more profitable firms are more likely to 
have close political ties, either because the state’s corporatist strategy is to recruit the 
most influential entrepreneurs, or because these entrepreneurs have more resources with 
which to co-operate with the state. With closer political connections, they are supposed to 
be more conservative. They are also more likely to gain bank loans. Connections with 
local government officials are more important to entrepreneurs relying on local 
businesses, while enterprises relying on exports may have less political connections for 
they deal with foreign companies directly. With more foreign connections, they are more 
likely to be influenced by foreign business styles, and have more liberal views. 
Enterprises bought from former SOEs inherited political connections as legacies and the 
entrepreneurs who buy these former SOEs are supposed to be more politically embedded 
and ideologically conservative. 
Three demographic features, i.e., gender, age, and education are included and 
assumed to affect all endogenous variables, political embeddedness, access to state-run 
bank loans, democratic desirability and government support. Summary statistics of the 
control variables can be found in table 11 in the Appendix. 
Model and Results 
The model constructed based on the hypotheses proposed above is presented in 
Figure 1. Exogenous variables listed in the rectangular box on the left-hand side of Figure 
1 are allowed to affect all endogenous variables on the right-hand side. Political 
background variables are used to test whether the relations between political 
embeddedness and attitudes toward democracy and the government are spurious, in 
which case, political embeddedness and conservative values could both be explained by 
political background. Private entrepreneurs’ political embeddedness is assumed to affect 
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their access to state-run bank loans, which is supposed to create support for the current 
government and induce negative attitudes toward democracy. Political embeddedness is 
assumed to still have direct effects on democratic desirability and government support, 
because there could be some other mechanisms, such as personal friendship, frequent 
communications, and economic benefits besides access to bank loans, for political 
connections to affect entrepreneurs’ values. There is assumed to be a mutually 
influencing relationship between democratic desirability and government support, but the 
complex recursive model makes the Amos software crash, so only the effect of 
democratic desirability on government support is predicted in this model. This estimation 
could give us some sense of the relationship between these two dimensions, but not the 







    









Figure 1: path model based on proposed hypotheses. Exogenous variables in the rectangular box are 
allowed to influence all the variables on the right hand side. 
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This model is not a perfect fit on the data. The chi-squared statistic is 892 with 271 
degrees of freedom, which indicates an imperfect fit (p < .000). However, based on three 
other model fit indexes - Comparative Fit Index (CFI = .951), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI 
= .930), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA = .033) - this model is 
a close approximate fit on the data, and can be used to test hypotheses. The results of data 
analyses are presented in table 7. 
Table 7 Results of the SEM model 




Estimate Estimate S.E. 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Political embeddedness -.047 .029 -.063 .112*** .030 .137 
State-run bank loan -.063 .037 -.045 .005 .036 .003 
Former official -.022 .052 -.011 -.076 .051 -.037 
Former SOE employee .057 .036 .043 .010 .035 .007 
Former village cadre -.048 .069 -.019 .107 .068 .038 
Veteran .019 .076 .007 .090 .074 .029 
CCP member before business .049 .057 .030 -.116* .056 -.064 
Former SOE -.029 .039 -.020 .015 .038 .010 
Number of employees .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.005 
Annual net profit .000 .000 .034 .000** .000 .079 
Local earning % .001 .001 .031 -.002** .001 -.096 
Exports % .000 .001 -.021 -.002** .001 -.102 
Gender (female=1) -.128* .053 -.063 -.060 .052 -.027 
Age  .001 .002 .008 .001 .002 .010 
Education  .017* .007 .070 .004 .007 .015 
Democratic desirability    -.374*** .032 -.345 




Estimate Estimate S.E. 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Political embeddedness    .038* .018 .070 
Former official .201*** .046 .079 .048 .031 .035 
Former SOE employee .162*** .032 .093 .040 .022 .043 
Former village cadre .452*** .061 .133 -.069 .042 -.038 
Veteran .199** .068 .052 .011 .046 .006 
CCP member before business 1.189*** .042 .540 -.003 .034 -.002 
Former SOE .132*** .034 .070 -.006 .023 -.006 
Number of employees .000** .000 .060 .000 .000 .004 
Annual net profit .000** .000 .061 .000** .000 .074 
Local earning % -.003*** .001 -.151 .000 .000 -.031 
Exports % -.003*** .001 -.118 .001 .000 .056 
Gender (female=1) -.070 .047 -.026 .021 .032 .014 
Age  -.013*** .002 -.119 -.002 .001 -.034 
Education  .018** .006 .056 .009* .004 .052 
Model fit indexes  CFI = .951  TLI = .930  RMSEA = .033 
Notes: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
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According to the results, four general findings could be interpreted. First, contrary to 
former understandings, but consistent with the results in the former part of this study, 
political embeddedness does not have significant impacts on democratic desirability, 
either directly or indirectly. Private entrepreneurs with a higher level of political 
embeddedness do not significantly dislike democracy more than other entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, although they are widely embedded into the political system, they are still 
more likely to endorse democratic values than other social groups.  
Second, while political embeddedness does not affect democratic values significantly, 
it does give rise to government support among private entrepreneurs. Politically 
embedded entrepreneurs are significantly more likely to support the current government. 
This result is contrary to the finding by Chen & Dickson (2008). They found “only red 
capitalists who were former cadres were reliable supporters of the government”, political 
embeddedness “did not create support for the regime”. However, according to this study, 
former government officials, SOE employees, village cadres and veterans are all not 
significantly more likely to support the government. Background variables only have 
indirect positive effects on government support by increasing level of political 
embeddedness. In addition, entrepreneurs who were CCP members before they started 
businesses are less likely to be satisfied with the performance of the current government, 
probably because they are more likely to be demanding of the state. Entrepreneurs 
making more profits are more likely to be satisfied with the government. All else being 
equal, one standard deviation increase in the annual net profit of an enterprise will 
increase the entrepreneur’s support for the government by .079 units. Higher level of 
dependence on local business and exports both decrease the entrepreneurs’ support for 
the government.  
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Third, political background is not the reason for the result that political embeddedness 
does not have significant impacts on democratic values. Although political background is 
very important in enhancing political embeddedness, none of these five background 
variables has significant impacts on democratic values. Former government officials, 
former SOE employees, former village cadres, veterans, and CCP members before 
businesses are all more likely to currently be politically embedded. But it turns out 
entrepreneurs with political connections before businesses do not necessarily have more 
negative values toward democracy than others. Democratic desirability couldn’t be 
explained by firm’s characteristics either. Only education and gender could meaningfully 
predict democratic values. 
Lastly, access to state-run bank loans is not a mediating mechanism between political 
embeddedness and attitudes toward democracy and the current government. Politically 
embedded entrepreneurs are more likely to gain state-run bank loans, but access to bank 
loans neither create support for the government nor decrease support for democratic 
values. As a result, political embeddedness does not have indirect effects on democratic 
values through access to bank loans. Since there are no significant direct impacts either, 
according to this result, political embeddedness does not influence democratic values. As 
to attitudes toward the current government, it is likely that economic benefits from 
political embeddedness can’t be adequately captured by access to bank loans, so the 
effects of economic benefits are likely included in the significant direct effects of 
political embeddedness on government support. 
 In sum, political embeddedness is not found as having significant impacts on private 
entrepreneurs’ democratic values. Therefore as a social group, despite having widespread 
political connections, private entrepreneurs are more likely to demonstrate democratic 
M.Phil.	  in	  Government	  and	  Public	  Administration                                              Thesis:	  JIN	  Shuai 
 34 
values than other social groups. It turns out that private entrepreneurs’ democratic values 
are also relatively independent from the influences of former political background and 
their firms’ characteristics. The formation of their democratic values is not very clear. 
The plausible reasons for their endorsement of democratic values are specified in the 
argument that they have higher stakes in government decisions, a stronger desire for free 
competition and private property protection.   
On the other hand, political embeddedness does increase support for the current 
government among private entrepreneurs. It seems that endorsement of democratic values 
is not necessarily conflicting with support for the current government. Politically 
embedded entrepreneurs would become more supportive for the government, but leave 
their democratic values unaffected. To better understand a private entrepreneur’s political 
attitudes, their views on democracy and the current government should be considered 
together as these two dimensions are not necessarily contradictory. In the following part, 
in-depth interviews with private entrepreneurs in Zhejiang province help to provide a 
better understanding of their political views.  
 
Feasibility of democracy and conservativeness of private entrepreneurs 
The previous parts have shown the general patterns of private entrepreneurs’ 
democratic values. They are more likely to have democratic values than other social 
groups, and political embeddedness does not significantly influence their democratic 
values. To get a more detailed and comprehensive picture of private entrepreneurs’ minds, 
personal interviews with private entrepreneurs in Zhejiang province were conducted in 
winter 2010. The interviewees were from various industries, such as garment, jewelry, 
garden tools, real estate etc. and owned different sizes of businesses with some having 
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less than ten employees, while others had thousands. They also had different levels of 
education and diverse family backgrounds. For example, one entrepreneur is the son of a 
former deputy Mayor, while others are children of poor peasants. In terms of political 
embeddedness, entrepreneurs with different levels of embeddedness were covered, from 
deputies in the national and local people’s congresses to village cadres. A list of the 
interviewees is presented in table 12 in the Appendix. 
Taking the entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward democracy and the current government 
together for consideration provides a much clearer picture of their political attitudes. 
Entrepreneurs who find democracy desirable tend to argue that democracy is not feasible 
in China. Based on the thoughts offered by the interviewees, a typology of entrepreneurs 
is proposed according to the two dimensions of their attitudes: democratic values and 
government support (table 8). A deep analysis of these four groups could help to get a 
more detailed and comprehensive understanding of Chinese private entrepreneurs and 
their perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of democracy in China. From the 
outset, it should be mentioned that all entrepreneurs interviewed are local people in 
Zhejiang province. They were born there and most of them conduct their businesses 
mainly in Zhejiang, so the impact of the local economic and political conditions on their 
opinions should not be neglected. Although it is inappropriate to generalize their attitudes 
to the whole country, the meaningful insights provided by them still have a certain degree 
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Table 8 A typology of private entrepreneurs’ political attitudes 




Negative I Pessimistic  (negative, negative) 
II Democratic support 
(negative, positive) 




The first group of entrepreneurs has negative attitudes toward both democracy and the 
current regime. They do not consider democracy a better alternative and are particularly 
unimpressed by the “bad” performance of the democracy in Taiwan. That democracy 
could lead to slower economic growth, possible chaos and even political violence, and 
lower government capacities are the common reasons given. Moreover, some capitalists 
do not believe that under democracy their interests could be better represented. As a 
capitalist who produces garden tools for export told me, "even under democracy, no 
matter who wins the election, policies will not change a lot; interests of ordinary people 
can not be really represented. Policies won't be better or worse; they are always beneficial 
for someone, and harmful for the others. Democracy will not make a difference."  
Despite their negative assessment of democracy, they do not support the current 
regime either. They criticize all the drawbacks of the current system - the abuse of power, 
violation of individual rights and corruption. They realize one Party rule is the essential 
cause of these problems, but do not think that democracy is an effective alternative to 
solve these problems. As a result, their strategy is to try to figure out how to live with the 
current situation, maximizing their economic interests, and avoiding involvement in 
politics.  
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The second group is different from the first type in assessing democracy. They 
endorse democratic values and have negative judgments of the current government. They 
consider democracy a good regime type and complain about the current political system, 
under which their political rights and freedom cannot be assured, with no effective 
constraint on political power. They are clearly aware of how democracy operates in 
western countries, and aware of their personal rights, even the fundamental political 
rights in determining government, and have high expectations of rule of law. They are 
also clear about the flaws in the current regime, like the political injustice, useless 
elections and so on.  
Then why do not they advocate democracy in China? In fact, this group of capitalists 
also takes the strategy of avoiding politics, due to their concern of the feasibility of 
democracy. Among this group, facing Chinese political reality, they provide three 
different perspectives about the infeasibility of democracy in China. The first subgroup 
believes that it is simply impossible to displace the CCP. Someone with an experience of 
collective petition told me it was useless to argue with the government, so gradually they 
tend to be politically apathetic and focus on their own businesses. The second subgroup 
considers that it is impossible for one or two entrepreneurs to make a change. They have 
to observe the wider atmosphere to make a judgment. One capitalist running a clothing 
enterprise with more than 500 workers who is a delegate in the local people’s congress 
told me that as a delegate he can only provide a few negligible suggestions and cast a few 
meaningless votes. In order to make real changes, he has to rely on the whole strength of 
the private economy and the strategies taken by other entrepreneurs. The third subgroup 
considers democracy infeasible in China due to the low political efficacy of ordinary 
Chinese people. They consider it not an economic problem but a cultural problem. They 
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think the patriarchal leadership style and egocentric culture deeply routed in ancient 
history will not really change. The tolerance and political efficacy of ordinary people 
required by democracy does not occur in China. Therefore, although democracy is 
desirable, it will not work in the Chinese context. As a result, all these considerations are 
driving them toward maintaining the status quo. 
The fourth group of capitalists is different from the second one in that besides their 
endorsement of democratic values, they still have faith in the current Chinese government. 
They support both democracy and the current government. According to them, 
democracy is good and is the direction of Chinese political reform, but it should be 
pursued gradually. They do not consider it feasible in China at present. With only a short 
period of economic improvement, this country still faces many challenges, as described 
by White (1994: 80-81), “the challenges to break through powerful ecological and 
economic constraints on development, to guide rapid economic modernization, and to 
develop a capacity to compete internationally, to generate and redistribute resources to 
constrain regional and class-based inequalities and alleviate poverty, to restrain 
population growth, to provide productive jobs for a vast and expanding workforce, and to 
achieve a rapid rise in overall levels of material welfare.” These developmental tasks 
often require a state with strong authority and capacity. Thus they feel the one party 
ruling system has its merits in confronting China’s developmental challenges and is 
suitable for China today.  
From this perspective, the infeasibility of democracy in China today is due to 
economic reasons but not constraints routed in culture or something that cannot change. 
With economic improvement and social development, the obstacles to democratization in 
the future will not be as salient as in today's China. They think democracy is the objective 
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of Chinese political reform, but it has to be carried out under more advanced economic 
and social conditions. In the current stage, stable social order is the first priority. The 
political reform has to be a gradual process and led by the CCP. So for this group of 
capitalists, their strategy is to take a moderate and gradual approach to promote a top-
down political reform, and under specific circumstances, they would like to participate 
actively and to a certain extent, influence the political reform in the liberal direction. 
The last type of capitalists I interviewed has negative impressions of democracy and 
positive judgments of the current regime type. They are the truly conservative capitalists. 
They oppose multi-party competition and endorse the values advocated by the CCP. 
From their perspective, the one party system and democratic centralism - one of the 
CCP's major principles - are the best for China, not only in the current stage but also in 
the future. They do not want to give up one party ruling even though they are aware of 
the flaws of it. They support the government's gradual reform in applying rule of law and 
in eliciting more political participation, but insist on one party rule. Reform in the open 
and a liberal direction will contribute to the transition of the current regime to a more 
participatory political system, which they think is enough. For example, one capitalist, 
who is a village leader directly elected by the villagers, said that too much democracy 
was not desirable. Direct elections of local level leaders should be attempted when social 
economic conditions are mature enough, but the one party system could not be changed.  
Based on the analyses of the four types of entrepreneurs, it could be inferred that no 
matter which group an entrepreneur belongs to, the most likely strategy he will take is to 
focus on his own business and to live with the current political system. Some choose to 
be politically apathetic, while some choose to make use of the current system to 
maximize their own interests. They try to cultivate good relations with state agents and 
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resolve problems through informal means. Some private entrepreneurs will probably try 
to participate in the political reform and promote it in the direction of democracy when 
their own strengths and social status allow them to, while some others truly support the 
policies and values delivered by the government and uphold the one party ruling system. 
With these analyses, it seems reasonable to conclude that although in general, private 
entrepreneurs have democratic values; most of them are status quo oriented and adopt 
pro-government strategies. Therefore, in public opinion surveys investigating 
governmental support, their responses indicate that they are not likely to be agents of 
political changes in China. The infeasibility of democracy prevents them from advocating 
democratization, although democracy is desirable.  
The main reasons they provided for the infeasibility of democracy in China can be 
grouped into three categories. First, the cultural argument attributes the non-applicability 
of democracy to China’s historically deeply rooted non-democratic culture. The 
entrepreneurs often mentioned that Chinese culture is not compatible with democracy. 
The long history of authoritarianism and popular obedience to authority are not 
conducive to democracy. It is also believed that the lack of democratic spirit in Chinese 
culture cannot really change. Under democracy, without the required spirit and capability 
of ordinary people, the situation could worsen.  
Second, the insufficient economic and social development argument claims that 
democracy is not feasible in modern China, which still encounters so many 
developmental challenges. A strong government is still required to maintain social 
stability and guide rapid modernization. One party authority has its merits in governing 
China in the current stage, where development is the main target. As stated by White 
(1994, 82), “democracy is difficult in a society in which the vast majority of the 
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population is engaged in a remorseless struggle for material existence and lacks the time, 
energy, knowledge and skills to be active political participants”. Political reform has to 
occur in a gradual process with economic improvement and social development as 
prerequisites.  
Third, the CCP has made it very clear that it is impossible for it to give up its 
leadership and the one party system. Given the power of the CCP, some capitalists are 
pessimistic about a liberal democracy in China. As one capitalist said, "One party ruling 
is written in the Chinese constitution, it is impossible to change."  
The perceptions of the desirability and feasibility of democracy should be considered 
as two key dimensions of private entrepreneurs’ attitudes toward democracy, and should 
both be taken into account when examining their democratic support. This typology of 
entrepreneurs’ political attitudes along the dimensions of democratic values and 
government support clearly shows the variations among private entrepreneurs and helps 
to provide a more vivid and detailed sketch of the minds of Chinese private entrepreneurs. 
Although in general they are more likely to have democratic values, they tend to consider 
democracy infeasible in China.    
 
Conclusion 
This study addresses one critical and highly debated issue regarding whether China’s 
private entrepreneurs support democracy. In general, democracy is desirable to Chinese 
private entrepreneurs. Analyses of the data from CGSS 2006 demonstrate that private 
entrepreneurs are more likely to endorse democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial 
middle and working class with effects of relevant factors held equal. Their requirements 
for an institutionalized free market, rule of law and private property protection, and their 
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higher stakes in government policies, higher social status and political self-efficacy are 
believed to contribute to their endorsement of democratic values. 
 In addition, politically embedded private entrepreneurs are not less likely to 
demonstrate democratic values. Political embeddedness is not found to have significant 
impacts on private entrepreneurs’ democratic values. Political background of 
entrepreneurs before they entered businesses does not have significant effects on their 
current democratic values either. Democratic values of entrepreneurs are relatively free 
from the impacts of their current level of political embeddedness and their previous 
political background. Therefore, although various kinds of informal and formal 
connections with the government are widespread among private entrepreneurs, they are 
still found to be more likely to endorse democratic values than other social groups. 
On the other hand, political embeddedness does create support for the current 
government among private entrepreneurs. One possible explanation could be that their 
relations with the government provide them with more opportunities to contact and 
communicate with government officials. This increased communication helps them better 
understand the government’s positions so they are more likely to support the government. 
Endorsement of democratic values and support for the current government seem to 
not be mutually exclusive. According to these two dimensions, a typology of private 
entrepreneurs’ political attitudes is constructed based on the thoughts gained through 
personal interviews with private entrepreneurs in Zhejiang province. The entrepreneurs 
who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, 
at least in the near future. As a result, they either tend to be passive or apathetic, or tend 
to support gradual top-down political reform in pursuing political changes. As a whole, 
Chinese private entrepreneurs are status quo orientated.  
M.Phil.	  in	  Government	  and	  Public	  Administration                                              Thesis:	  JIN	  Shuai 
 43 
The scholars having optimistic anticipations of the democratic orientations of Chinese 
private entrepreneurs have concentrated on the desirability of democracy, while concerns 
regarding the feasibility of democracy in China are not adequately discussed. On the 
other hand, the literature demonstrating private entrepreneurs’ support for the current 
regime has revealed their status quo oriented strategies, while overlooking their 
democratic values. It is possible that entrepreneurs demonstrating democratic values still 
have the potential to be inspired by the desirability of democracy. They are probably 
contingent democrats. When the conditions change, they are likely to make different 
choices, as their abilities or macro social environment allow them to do so. As 
investigated in Acemoglu and Robinson’s 2006 study, income equality under an 
authoritarian regime plays an important role in determining the willingness of capitalists 
to accept democracy.   
Private entrepreneurs’ conservativeness in pursuing democracy is not linked to the 
success of the state’s corporatist strategy, but occurs due to their concern of the 
infeasibility of democracy. The corporatist strategy of the government is only partially 
successful in that politically embedded entrepreneurs tend to support the government, but 
they are not less likely to endorse democratic values. Furthermore, it is also possible that 
corporatism does not create support for the government, but the government selects the 
most supportive entrepreneurs in the first place. Since democratic values are more 
difficult to detect, the government fails to select the most conservative entrepreneurs in 
terms of democratic values, but recruits according to the more obvious attitudes toward 
the government. 
To conclude, opinions regarding the desirability and feasibility of democracy should 
be classified as two essential dimensions of Chinese private entrepreneurs’ attitudes 
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toward democracy, and should both be taken into account when examining their 
democratic support. This study shows that in general Chinese private entrepreneurs find 
democracy desirable, and their democratic values are not significantly influenced by 
political embeddedness, but they tend to consider democracy infeasible, at least in China 
today. In real life, entrepreneurs tend to concentrate on their own businesses and try to 
live with the current political system. The business environment is changing quickly and 
they have many problems to deal with in daily operations of businesses. Some of the 
tough problems they are facing are believed as not caused by the regime type per se, and 
therefore probably could not be resolved by advocating democracy, for instance the 
appreciation of Chinese currency, the global economic recession resulting in exports 
dropping, and the difficulty of employing migrant workers due to the decreasing rate of 
labor mobility. These busy private entrepreneurs do not pose a significant threat to the 
Chinese state. They tend to maintain the status quo. 
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Table 9 Summary statistics of the control variables in the test of CGSS 2006 data 
Variables  Mean S. D. N 
Age  47.10 12.58 6,700 
Household income in the last year in Yuan 27123.55 189207.1 6,700 
Household income in the last year in logged 9.58 .96 6,700 
Schooling years 8.26 4.07 6,700 
Percentage of employees in private sector at 
provincial level (%) 
10.11 10.78 6,700 
Respondent’s CCP membership (yes = 1) .10 .28 6,700 
Respondent’s father’s CCP membership (yes = 1) .09 .29 6,700 
Vote in recent election (yes = 1) .30 .45 6,700 
Hukou status (rural = 1) .48 .49 6,700 
Gender (female=1) .50 .49 6,700 
 Percentage  
Occupational sector  6,700 
(base group) Private sector  6.15  412 
 Public owned business 35.85  2,402 
 Government agency 2.67  179 
 Public institution 1.64  110 
 Self-employed / farmer 53.69  3,597 
Region    6,700 
(base group) Eastern  36.12  2,420 
 Central 40.36  2,704 
 Western 23.52  1,576 
Educational Attainment  Percentage    
 Entrepreneurs Middle class Working class 
None (base group) .60 .55 9.63 
Elementary 8.98 4.31 25.11 
Junior Secondary 38.32 18.78 38.84 
Senior Secondary 38.92 35.47 21.02 
Post Secondary 13.17 40.88 5.40 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 10 Measurement models of the SEM analyses: variable description  
Outcome variables: Mean  S.D. Std. factor loading 
 Latent government support: Evaluations of government’s performance 
1 = very bad; 2 = bad; 3 = fair; 4 = good; 5 = very good 
Providing job security 3.230 .806 .691 
Narrowing the gap between rich and poor 2.870 .914 .700 
Improving housing conditions 3.275 .852 .739 
Maintaining social order 3.399 .926 .604 
Providing adequate medical care 3.024 .937 .757 
Providing welfare to the needy 3.214 .834 .653 
 Latent democratic desirability: do you agree or disagree with these statements 
1 = Strongly agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly disagree 
Government leaders are like heads of family, and 
their decisions should be obeyed 3.052 1.072 .551 
If a country has multiple parties, it can lead to 
political chaos 2.806 1.023 .628 
A one-party system promotes economic, social, 
and political development, and is most suitable 
to China 
2.399 .941 .692 
Public demonstrations can easily turn into social 
disturbances and impact social stability and 
should be forbidden 
2.384 1.029 .753 
Forming various kinds of nongovernmental 
organizations can easily damage social stability 2.838 1.084 .799 
 Latent political embeddedness     
CCP status  1.764 .959 .913 
(1 = no party members; 2 = democratic parties members; 3 = CCP members) 
Delegates in people’s congresses  .641 1.176 .739 
0 = never; 1 = township level; 2 = County level; 3 = Prefectural level; 4 = Provincial level; 5 = 
national level 




Table 11 Summary statistics of the variables in the SEM analyses 
Variable Mean S.D. N  
Access to state-run bank loan (yes = 1) .318 .466 2072 
Former official (yes = 1) .134 .340 2072 
Former SOE employee (yes = 1) .510 .500 2072 
Former village cadre (yes = 1) .069 .254 2072 
Veteran (yes = 1) .053 .224 2072 
CCP member before business (yes = 1) .192 .394 2072 
Former SOE (yes = 1) .303 .460 2072 
Number of employees 225.290 1458.933 2067 
Annual net profit 290.520 2242.779 1940 
Local earning % 61.235 37.530 1979 
Exports % 18.749 34.847 1729 
Gender (female=1) .116 .320 2052 
Age 49.047 7.630 2052 
Education 10.354 2.607 2042 
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Table 12 List of interviewees 
No. Date Industry  Approximate No. of 
employees 
Position 
1 12/29/2010 Woven bags 200 Owner 
2 12/30/2010 Bedding 10 Owner  
3 12/31/2010 Fleet, garment  60 Owner  
4 12/31/2010 Garment 30 Owner  
5 01/01/2011 Garment 500 Owner  
6 01/01/2011 Art ware 10 Owner  
7 01/01/2011 Jewelry  50 Owner  
8 01/02/2011 Construction  50 Owner  
9 01/04/2011 Hangers 100 Owner  
10 01/04/2011 Jewelry, real estate  2000 President of the Board 
11 01/05/2011 Garden tools 70 Owner  
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